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Abstract 
Research objective. The purpose of this paper is to provide an explicit theoretical framework for 
the design and implementation of incentive pay based on the extensive earlier literature regarding 
the topic. Furthermore, the discussed frame of reference will be utilized to evaluate current incentive 
pay policies in the Finnish major hockey league, Liiga. Since no earlier research covering this specific 
topic exists, the aim for this study is as well to initiate further discussion concerning opportunities 
to enhance athletic performance through financial incentives which may eventually be indirectly 
reflected positively in financial performance as well. 
Data and methodology. This paper can be described as a case study, which evaluates current 
incentive policies in Finnish professional hockey in relation to theoretical framework. Since no 
relevant previous data covering this specific topic exists, the latter part of this paper presents the 
results of a survey directed to 69 players in Liiga. To support these results, three executives working 
in Liiga organizations were interviewed to compose an extensive overview on the status quo 
regarding monetary incentives. 
Results. The most effective incentives appear to derive from career development, while in 
contrast, the endogenous contract-based incentives form only a minor part of incentives. The 
absence of monetary incentives occurs mostly due to very competitive labour markets, which forces 
organizations to increase base salaries while competing for desired recruitments. As a result, the 
guaranteed compensation comes closer, or in some cases may even exceed the estimated value of 
player contribution which results to declined willingness for organizations to offer monetary 
incentives on top of base salaries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Paying for performance constitutes an interesting subfield of personnel economics, as it is very 
practical and affects all of us in working life. Previous research on incentive pay provides an 
extensive and robust framework for examining key aspects of incentive pay systems. The 
subject has also been under an intensive discussion in economic research over recent decades 
(see e.g. Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Datar et al., 2001; Baker, 2001; Prendergast & Topel, 
1993). A high-quality incentive pay system provides companies with an effective tool to 
improve employee performance. More accurately, a well-designed incentive system motivates 
employees to work harder, smarter, and most of all, better in line with company level objectives 
(Gibbs, 2012). 
 
In non-sports industries, collective bargaining agreements limit employers’ ability for local 
contracting, and salaries lack especially downward flexibility when poor employee 
performance takes place. In contrast, European professional team sports offers an interesting 
platform for studying incentive pay policies since labour markets are highly competitive and 
wages are more elastic due to the absence of strong collective agreements restricting 
negotiations concerning salaries. Furthermore, contracts are relatively short in duration, 
allowing organizations to react to perceived results and thus adjust incentives over time 
(Longley, 2018). According to a financial analysis conducted by Ernst & Young (2019), the 
operational environment for the professional hockey organizations in the Finnish major hockey 
league, Liiga, has been recently quite challenging from financial perspective. At the same time, 
on average more than a third of organizational costs are allocated to player salaries, forming a 
significant portion of expenditure. Thus, it is interesting to study how much attention has been 
paid towards the incentives offered for the players. 
 
This study can be described as a case study, the aim of which is first to discuss the theoretical 
framework regarding incentive pay. Further, this paper examines the current incentive policies 
in Liiga and assesses them in relation to the theoretical framework. I expect to find some 
inefficiencies regarding current policies, and thus aspire for providing valuable suggestions for 
the future. Moreover, previous research on incentives in Finnish professional sports is quite 
limited, and this paper looks forward to initiate further discussion for opportunities to enhance 
athletic performance in Finnish organisations, which may eventually lead to improved financial 
performance as well. 
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2 INCENTIVE PAY 
 
Incentive pay offers an effective mechanism for organizations to improve worker performance. 
The benefits arise from positive effects to firm value through employees working harder, 
smarter and moreover, their objectives become more synchronized with the firm level goals 
(Gibbs, 2012). Kessler (1993) describes incentive systems as a concept that can be summarized 
as rewarding two competing employees simply so that a more productive individual should, in 
theory, always receive better compensation for labour input. Lazear & Gibbs (2015) provide a 
deeper rationale behind incentive schemes, as they propose that incentive pay provides 
significant value for the organization, on condition that sufficient amount of resources has been 
invested in designing process. If the guidelines are confusing, employees may inadvertently 
destroy value, even if the ultimate goal of the incentive scheme would be explicitly determined 
to maximize firm value.  
 
This paper approaches incentives trough economic theory and focuses on monetary rewards. 
However, it is important to notice the multidimensional nature of incentives and motivation, 
and incentive systems have been approached also through non-economic frameworks, such as 
equity or expectancy theories (see e.g. Robbins, 1997). Despite the broad earlier literature 
explicates motivation also through psychological mechanisms, this paper utilizes the agency 
problem as its backbone for evaluating the effectiveness of existing pay-for-performance 
schemes in Liiga. 
 
2.1 Agency theory 
 
The field of personnel economics describes the problem in contracting between the employee 
(agent) and the employer (principal) through agency theory. Organizations are pursuing firm 
value maximization by means of worker productivity. Besides improving employee’s skills, 
output maximization can be pursued by encouraging workers to increase their level of effort. 
The conflict of interest arises because the costliness of effort encourages employee to shirk. To 
prevent employees from shirking, employer can either monitor worker contribution or affect to 
individual behaviour. Since the psychology of personnel is hardly governable, organizations 
should utilize contracting and reward desirable performance with extrinsic incentives (Longley, 
2018). 
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Agency theory is based on an assumption of completely rational individuals with equal 
preferences maximizing welfare through optimal effort with respect to expected utility deriving 
from pay. The agent’s utility function is built from two factors: leisure and wealth. The 
costliness of effort describes the appreciation of leisure, whereas pay relates to the utility 
deriving from increased level of wealth. Hence, worker requires a compensation that at least 
equals the cost of effort. Furthermore, the agent is assumed being risk-averse by nature. 
Therefore, the agent must be compensated the riskiness of a pay as a premium for uncertainty 
of the forthcoming compensation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
2.2 The three elements of incentive pay 
 
Gibbs (2012) offers an explicit framework for designing effective incentive systems. His paper 
approaches incentive pay systems through three key components: performance evaluation P, 
pay for performance I(P) and base salary S. His observations are very consistent with earlier 
literature (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979; Lazear & Gibbs, 2015). Hence, the following formal notations 
in this paper relies on his observations, unless otherwise citated. 
 
Employee contributes to firm value Q, through his efforts, 𝑒𝑖, in multidimensional tasks i = 1, 
2 …, n. This paper looks into effectiveness of incentive pay in professional sports, and thus, Q 
can be interpreted for winning games as a team. As mentioned, employee is risk-averse by 
nature and appreciates leisure and wealth. Thus, the utility function of the worker can be 
denoted: 
 
U = E[Pay] –  
1
2
 R Pay
2 – 
1
2
 C 𝑖𝑒𝑖
2    (1) 
 
The first term relates to the riskiness of the pay: R is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion 
and  Pay
2 is the variation of pay. Here, it is important to notice that  Pay
2 does not depend 
on 𝑒𝑖, and therefore risk premium and effort decision do not depend on each other. C denotes 
marginal disutility of effort, and together with the middlemost term they form the certainty 
equivalent value for risky income. Here, the reservation utility (outside option or complete 
shirking) is normalized to zero. The agent chooses optimal level of effort to maximize U with 
respect to the participation constraint U ≥ 0. 
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In contrast, employer maximizes profits Π = E(𝑄 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦) by utilizing the three key 
components performance evaluation P, incentive pay I(P) and base salary S. Consequently, pay 
must be tied with performance, that needs to be measured through P. To be explicit, P must 
capture worker’s effort well enough to create any incentives. Finally, the employee is 
compensated through base salary S and incentive pay I(P). Hence, rational employee 
maximizes utility: 
 
 maxe𝑖   S + E[I(P)] –  
1
2
 R Pay
2 – 
1
2
 C 𝑖𝑒𝑖
2    
 
      (2) 
 
This formal intuition facilitates understanding that base wage is not constitutive part of 
worker incentives, since S does not vary with effort. Base salary plays significant role in 
attracting desirable candidates in labor markets whereas, from the incentive perspective, it 
remains to be the least important factor. 
 
 
 
Equation (2) discloses two focal elements for any incentive system. The designer must think 
carefully how well the measuring system captures effort, in other words 𝜕𝑃 should equal 𝜕𝑒𝑖 
in optimal measuring system. Another key component is the incentive intensity dI/dP, the 
Figure 1: Three components of incentive pay plan. 
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slope in Figure 1. The two previous are closely linked together, since the ability to evaluate 
performance determines largely the optimal intensity of incentive pay. 
 
So far, the key components behind incentive systems are discussed. To further facilitate the 
conceptual understanding, the following theoretical sections will elaborate performance 
evaluation P, and eventually optimal intensity of incentives I(P) to form an effective incentive 
pay plan for the worker. 
 
3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
Organizations need to monitor performance in order to reward successful employees. 
Monitoring can be conducted through two methods, quantitative or subjective evaluation.  
Quantitative measures are numeric, involving for instance accounting numbers, stock price or 
in context of ice hockey, goals scored by individual player or games won as a team. In contrast, 
subjective evaluation utilizes supervisor discretion to evaluate performance, usually assessed 
through numerical scales or verbal feedback such as “exceeded standards”.  
 
Effective performance evaluation requires well-defined and clearly communicated objectives 
and measurement system. Too often, employees have little knowledge of the measuring criteria, 
which may cause too low level of effort or alternatively, the effort might be incorrectly directed 
(Lazear and Gibbs, 2015). Cooperative teams have become a fixed part of modern organizations 
pushing employees to improve their social and cooperative skills to supplement occupational 
competence. Simultaneously, the characteristics of job design has expanded, and thus 
measuring individual performance has become very multi-layered. Evaluation systems need to 
acknowledge possible free-riding and variance in workers’ cooperation levels, and still gauge 
individual contributions effectively (Carlock, 2012). 
 
3.1 Quantitative performance measurement 
 
With further assumption that incentive part of the pay I(P) is linear and composed of 
commission rate b multiplied with the value of performance measure P, optimal intensity of 
incentives depends on certain underlying properties relevant to any numeric measure. The 
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following section provides a formulation for optimal level of effort for the worker as well 
optimal strength of incentives set by the employer.  
 
Output can be denoted as 𝑄 =  q𝑖 e𝑖 +  μ  and performance measure 𝑃 =  p𝑖e𝑖 +  ε, where q𝑖  
and p𝑖 denote the marginal benefit of Q and P, whereas  and  all random, uncontrollable 
events (mean = 0) taking place during measuring period. Assuming q𝑖  and p𝑖  are likely to be 
random for the organization, and worker observes p𝑖 before choosing e𝑖. Eventually, the firm 
is able to scale performance measure in various units, while I(P) rescales it to monetary value 
for rewarding employee based on performance. For instance, hockey organization in Liiga is 
able to measure player performance in goals scored, and moreover, broaden chosen measures 
more suitable for different roles inside the team and then pay bonuses based on commission 
rate b and value of performance measure. Disregarding such details, optimal effort and can be 
solved from equation (2), if assuming vectors |𝑞| and |𝑝| are identical length 1: 
√∑𝑞𝑖
2  = √∑𝑝𝑖
2 = 1. 
 
Consequently, 
 
     (3) 
Workers effort varies along with the incentive intensity which is described in the right side of 
equation (3). In the meanwhile, employer looks forward to maximizing expected profits 
E(𝑄 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦), considering (3) and participation constraint of the worker: 
 
(4) 
 
Equation (4) can be interpreted as the optimal intensity of incentives considering general 
properties of performance measures. Examples in the following sections elaborate this formal 
intuition of uncontrollable risk, distortion and controllable risk further. 
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Uncontrollable risk and distortion 
 
Earlier literature (see e.g. Holmstrom, 1979; Banker & Datar, 1989) emphasizes that key trade-
off exists between incentives and uncontrollable risk. Assuming1 that Q = P (so that ε = μ); 
𝜎𝜀
2 > 0, and the measuring system focuses on output somewhat imperfectly. Therefore, the 
optimal strength of incentives can be defined as 
 
 𝑏∗ =
1
1+𝑅𝐶𝜎𝜀
2 < 1.     (5) 
 
This form is not very useful alone but focusing on the relationship between 𝑏∗ and 𝜎𝜀
2 implies 
that when the measurement error (uncontrollable risk) increases, optimal strength of incentives 
is then weaker, because outcome is more sensitive for luck for both good and the bad. If 
reflecting this theoretical insight to professional hockey, broader measures such as winning as 
a team alters players for way higher uncontrollable risk since the outcome is highly dependent 
on teammates’ performance as well. Hence, theoretical intuition would suggest organizations 
to be careful in providing very strong incentives based on team performance. 
 
Expanding assumptions2 so that 𝑃 ≠ 𝑄 , 𝜎𝜀
2 > 0 and q𝑖  and p𝑖 are not random, optimal 
incentives appear to be: 
 
    (6) 
This (6) illustrates explicitly the second general property of any performance measure, 
distortion. Lazear and Gibbs (2015) emphasize that to accomplish its goals, organization must 
consider how well the chosen performance measure aligns employee interests and 
organizational goals. Equation (6) describes in a formal manner this alignment, while cos (𝜃) 
is the angle between vectors |𝑞| and |𝑝|, which equals the formal intuition of how well the 
marginal product of effort is matching with the effect on output (Datar et al., 2001; Baker, 
2002). To illustrate this particular phenomenon in sports, professional hockey players generally 
invest versatilely in physical conditioning covering e.g. strength, stamina and mobility training. 
If players would be rewarded only based on strength results in physical testing sessions, players 
 
1 Case 1: uncontrollable risk 
2 Case 2: distortion 
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might begin to invest only in strength conditioning ignoring other aspects of physical abilities, 
which leads to increased cos (𝜃). Being a successful team on ice requires diverse physical 
attributes, and thus this kind of measurement system offers an explicit example of distorted 
performance measure. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) remind that incentive plan should also 
equalize differences in motivation towards various tasks, and hence not only encourage harder 
effort in single task. 
 
Controllable risk 
 
Not all risk is detrimental. Consider equal assumptions as presented prior to equation (6). 
However, now3 the worker is able to observe marginal product of effort p𝑖 before decision. 
Furthermore, here marginal product of worker’s efforts may assumingly be stochastic, and the 
worker has specific knowledge how to adjust efforts over time, while the employer lacks this 
knowledge. Now 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑒, 𝑃 = 𝑝𝑒, and the optimal incentive intensity is equal with (4). With 
the scaling assumption, 𝐸(𝑞) = 𝐸(𝑝) = 1. Hence: 
,    (7) 
where  denotes the correlation between q and p, 𝑝 ≤ 1 and 𝑏∗ < 1. Here, smaller  depicts 
higher distortion, which decreases optimal strength of incentives. Nevertheless, key implication 
appearing from (7) is the third general property of measuring systems, controllable risk 𝜎𝑝
2. 
 
Relying on the assumption that the worker observes the marginal product of effort before 
deciding effort, this ability can be utilized by the worker to increase effort when p is high, and 
vice versa. To elaborate further, the optimal incentive intensity is dependent with , 𝜎𝑞
2 and 𝜎𝑝
2. 
To demonstrate the utility deriving from specific knowledge, 
 𝑏∗ =
1+𝜎𝑞
2 
1+𝜎𝑞
2+𝑅𝐶𝜎
2  
 .     (8) 
 
The benefit arises from the specific knowledge that can be related as a random variable for the 
employer, whilst it is relatively controllable for the employee. Thus, the incentive system should 
offer stronger incentives to encourage employee to utilize specific knowledge pursuing an 
 
3 Case 3: controllable risk 
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outcome where both parties would be better off. Moreover, if defining that  =
𝜎𝑞
𝜎𝑝
 denotes a 
measure of worker’s relative accuracy of specific knowledge on particular tasks optimal 
incentive intensity can be rewritten 
.     (9) 
 
All else equal, increase in worker’s specific knowledge should increase the strength of incentive 
part of the pay. Controllable risk is one of more recent observations in earlier literature 
regarding principle-agent problem (Baker, 1992). De Varo & Kurtulus (2010) and Barrenechea-
Mendez et al. (2011) are some of the latest contributors to empirical findings that suggest that 
the more controllable risk exists, the stronger incentives appear to be, and vice versa. 
 
After sorting out available measures, incentive pay designer must consider the scope of the 
measurement system. Furthermore, employer should assess if the measuring system involves 
only one measure, or alternatively combines several measures (Lazear & Gibbs, 2015). The 
principles behind these decisions are discussed briefly in the following. 
 
Balancing between risk and distortion 
 
Tradeoffs exist generally in any performance measurement system. Conceptually, this can be 
explicated through the scope of the measure. As a simplification, the chosen measure may be 
broadly defined of narrowly focused, and moreover, the scope can vary to several dimensions 
(Gibbs, 2012). Consider that employer would reward players based on team winning the 
championship, which involves enormous number of tasks that players pursue as both an 
individual and a team member to reach the goals set for receiving the reward. In contrast, simple 
measure based on individual performance, such as how much player shoots towards opposing 
goaltender, includes far less factors between performance and objective. While comparing these 
options, one must focus on the degree of risk and distortion: generally, any action during games 
can be performed in a way that increases the probability of winning, and therefore no distortion 
exists if player is rewarded fully based on games won as a team. In contrast, if player is 
rewarded based on shots on opponent goal, player may start to shoot thoughtlessly even though 
teammate would be wide open to score a goal if player under measurement would instead pass 
the puck rather than shoot selfishly. At the same time, these same examples involve completely 
the opposite characteristics regarding risk. As described earlier, incentive pay relying on 
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broader measures causes more risky income for player, whereas narrower measure reduces the 
risk. 
 
Combining measures 
 
As described earlier, performance measuring systems are challenging to design, and any single 
measure alone is not capable to provide sufficient amount or quality of information of 
employee’s efforts. According to Holmstrom’s “Informativeness Principle” (1979), 
performance measurement system should be supplemented by additional measures in case they 
provide marginal information of employee’s actions. Rewarding from performance can be 
based on different measures separately, or they can be combined into a single measure. 
Empirically, these both are popular and utilized in real-world contexts (Murphy, 1992). 
“Informativeness Principle” is based on observation that proper additional measures decrease 
distortion of an incentive plan. On the other hand, supplementing measuring systems with 
multiple measures arise different challenges, since measures generally vary in uncontrollable 
risk. This variance in characteristic of different measures results unbalanced incentive effects 
for the worker, since relative weights should depend on the level of uncontrollable risk for every 
measure (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Gibbs (2012) remarks that combining various may be 
useful for reducing uncontrollable risk if the measurement errors are negatively correlated. Let 
us notate performance measurement error of 𝑃3 is 
 
𝜎3
2 =  𝑏1
2𝜎1
2 +  𝑏2
2𝜎2
2 + 2𝑏1𝑏2𝜎12.    (10) 
 
 
If then 𝜎12 < 0, combining multiple measures is sufficient to decrease risk deriving from 
incentive pay for the worker. This notation is useful if wondering the benefits of relative 
performance evaluation (RPE), where employee performance is compared to some reference 
value. Even if the measurement error would be substantial, RPE sorts out the common effect of 
error and thus provides useful tool for ranking employees (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Gibbons & 
Murphy, 1990). This indicates that relative performance evaluation may be useful for 
organization in Liiga, since the competition setting does not change over time and is equal to 
every player, thus offering suitable environment for conducting relative performance 
evaluation. 
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3.2 Subjective evaluation 
 
Subjective evaluation has been researched relatively little, especially if compared to previous 
segments. However, it does not reduce the importance of effectiveness of subjective 
performance evaluation. Universally, supervisor discretion is playing some role in almost any 
occupations: promotion, threat of termination or providing better office location are all general 
examples of subjective evaluation (Gibbs, 2012). Subjective evaluation provides support for 
shortcomings of quantitative measures especially in complex working environments. It may be 
exploited to increase cooperation if quantitative system alone fails in this regard, and 
furthermore, incentive pay system involving subjective evaluation have been discovered to be 
positively associated with wage satisfaction (Gibbs et al., 2004). 
 
Most of earlier literature approaches subjective evaluation through prospective problems that 
may derive from it. Since the evaluation strongly depends on the supervisor, incentives and 
preferences of supervisor may cause biased results. One of possible adverse outcomes for the 
workers is favouritism, if the supervisor is not able to cherish neutrality on evaluations 
(Murphy, 1992; Prendegast & Topel, 1993). Alternatively, incentives may be distorted if 
worker acts in a way that pleases supervisor but is in conflict with firm level goals (Prendergast, 
1993). 
 
Lazear and Gibbs (2015) emphasize benefits for both sides. Supporting Gibbs et al. (2004), they 
suggest that benefits arise under extreme conditions impossible to perceive ex ante. Subjective 
evaluation is useful also in intermediate conditions. If an adverse outcome takes place due to 
recklessness, punishment may be fair if the employee would have been able to prevent such 
outcome. Moreover if e.g. employees in managerial level are not capable to accomplish 
adequate preparedness alone, they are still expected to organize their profit centre so that 
decisions are decentralized to ensure specific knowledge is exploited, for instance regarding 
safety at work. These examples may be suitable for professional sports, considering that injuries 
take place relatively often. Hence, employer could conduct an evaluation to define if it was due 
to inappropriate training methods reducing recovery or alternatively only bad luck. 
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Career-based incentives 
 
Career development is often based on subjectivity. Besides rewarding short-term performance, 
employers should offer an encouraging career ladders for workers. Empirically, career 
development provides a significant incentive to perform in job, since proceeding further in 
hierarchy usually requires signalling of one’s abilities to recruiting supervisors. Besides 
promotions increase earnings, it functions as an effective signal for labour markets for 
employee’s abilities and appreciation (Lazear & Gibbs, 2015). 
 
According to Gibbs (1994), career development is able to sort workers based on skills, but also 
generate incentives. His findings suggest that career development is often linked to significant 
increases in life-time earnings. Promotions involve an immediate reward, and despite if it would 
not be remarkable, merely the feeling of being able to pursue the next step in career ladders 
facilitates higher motivation and performance. 
 
Reflecting to promotions as a form of incentives based on subjective evaluation, the 
environment in professional hockey appears to offer effective structures for career-based 
incentives, since variation between earnings among different leagues are remarkable. For 
instance, in National Hockey League (NHL) players earn on average of $2.78 million per 
season, while in its main rival league, Kontinental Hockey League (KHL) contracts remain 
between $0.1 and $1.2 million in value. Despite players in Liiga are well-compensated 
professional athletes, the salary level remains closer to €100.000, while the average settles down 
to €75.000 and the highest paid players may receive up to €250.000 in euros. However, there 
are still many professional leagues in Europe, where earnings remain in lower levels than in 
Liiga. These observations indicate that players face significant incentives through career 
development since better performance increases probability to sign into top tier leagues where 
salaries can be enormous (Miettinen, 2020; Lempinen & Pesu, 2019; 2112 Hockey Agency, 
2020; Baker, 2019). 
 
 
4 TYING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
 
The last step in designing process is to choose whether incentive pay should be for linear or 
non-linear scheme. Theoretical section has discussed this far only linear incentive models, 
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where the incentive pay structure is completely linear without any modifications. An incentive 
plan that is fully based on performance is the most effective tool to prevent shirking. On the 
other hand, risk-averse agent is highly uncomfortable with this kind of plan as it provides no 
shield against uncontrollable events. As an upside, the pay increases unrestrictedly enabling 
very high earnings for the most talented employees. However, if no limit for rewarding exists, 
this structure involves high risk for the employer if superior performance takes place most likely 
due to luck. Thus, completely linear plan requires some modifications to suit well into real 
world contexts. A floor provides worker with a base wage and linearly growing reward after 
certain threshold. This type of incentive pay scheme shields employee against downside risk. 
However, it is important to set the threshold accurately. Appropriate threshold encourages 
worker to exert constant high effort. If the threshold is too challenging, there is not any 
incentives left since the flat section is the only relevant part of the function. For the employer 
side, reasonable limit provides insurance against excessive luck. To conclude, the vital benefit 
of the linear incentive pay model is the constant positive marginal benefit of effort. Hence, it 
encourages employees to constantly maximize the level of effort not dependent on past (Lazear 
& Gibbs, 2015). 
 
Another general rewarding structure is so-called lump-sum rewarding plan that provides a 
discrete bonus after ex ante set threshold. This kind of structure relates promotion as an 
incentive perfectly, since on average, shifting higher in hierarchy increases earnings. Another 
possibility to utilize this structure is when incentives rely heavily on subjective evaluation, and 
providing precise qualitative assessment is challenging. However, under certain circumstances 
this system may facilitate adverse courses of action. The slope of the marginal benefit of effort 
is either zero of infinite for the worker, meaning there exists extremely high incentives to exert 
effort, or vice versa no incentive at all. The latter occurs if the threshold is out of employee’s 
reach during the current measuring period. Infinite marginal benefit of effort arises when the 
threshold is relatively close at the end of the measuring, and employee aspires by any cost to 
reach the threshold. Thus, lump sum rewards may lead to excessively high risk taking or 
alternatively, complete shirking (Lazear & Gibbs, 2015; see also Tzioumis & Gee, 2013). 
Rewarding players with lump-sum plan may be problematic, since the marginal benefit of 
reaching objectives may potentially either be zero or infinite. For instance, if the threshold is 
set for 20 goals and the player has not scored enough in the first half of the season, incentives 
may be partly or fully removed since the threshold is out of reach. Player might undergo 
significant decline in motivation due to inadequately designed incentive system. 
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To summarize, the base wage covers worker from uncontrollable events, while limit reduces 
employer side risk in case excessive performance happens due to luck. Non-linear incentive 
pay plan links the marginal benefit of effort with past performance, which oftentimes 
encourages worker to increase risk taking or to decrease effort level significantly if rewards are 
out of reach. In contrast, linear models are very robust against these conflicts of interest deriving 
from previous performance, and thus leading towards more effective outcomes where both 
parties are better off.  
 
 
 
 
 
5 EFFECTIVENESS IN SPORTS: PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE IN NFL 
 
Kim et al. (2018) have studied the impact of increasing the relative share of incentive pay on 
the performance of National Football League (NFL). Regardless that financial resources of an 
average NFL organization are substantially larger than in organizations in Finnish professional 
hockey, this study provides some indication of the effectiveness of incentive pay in professional 
team sports. 
 
The researchers approach the effectiveness of incentive pay through two different measures, 
Winning Probability Added (WPA) and Expected Points Probability Added (EPA). These 
metrics are created to measure the effect of player performance on the probability of winning 
and collecting points, taking into account the varying level of importance between different 
situations inside the game. The authors validate these measures by emphasizing the 
Figure 2: Lump-sum bonus & linear bonus with floor and limit 
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fundamental idea behind player recruitment: players are signed based on expectations of their 
ability to increase probability of winning games, or ultimately the championship. 
 
The study included the realized monetary values of a total of 694 NFL contracts between 2004 
and 2013. Performance-based compensation ranged from 0% to 100%, of which as many as 
two-thirds were compensated solely based on accomplishing certain objectives and thresholds. 
For comparison, only 20% of contracts guaranteed more than one-third of realized income. The 
effect of incentives was examined by comparing differences in performance among players 
whose salaries were largely based on performance with the players whose income was less 
dependent on performance. If performance-based incentives would not really motivate 
individuals towards better performance, researchers should not detect significant differences 
between performance metrics. 
 
The results were explicit. Stronger incentives indeed had a positive effect on player 
performance, even in the highest income categories. In contrast, performance was not 
dependent on the length or total value of the contract at statistically significant level. This 
outcome is precisely in line with the theoretical intuition that key driver for encouraging players 
towards better performance is incentive pay rather than base wage.  
 
The credibility of the study is further enhanced by the fact that EPA and WPA metrics were 
built to isolate the performance and effort levels from pure good fortune. Furthermore, the 
setting between different games is very similar, and the rules in football supported by 
professional referees further promote comparability of player performance in the sample. 
Hence, this paper indicates that competitive advantage can be achieved through designing 
effective endogenous incentive pay systems for professional athletes. 
 
6 INCENTIVE PAY POLICIES IN LIIGA 
 
6.1 Research design 
 
Since there is no earlier data regarding incentive pay policies in Finnish professional hockey, 
the status quo remained to be found out by conducting a survey for the players. To supplement 
the survey, three executives working in Liiga organizations were interviewed. An ambition for 
this section is to constitute a distinct overview of incentive systems in Liiga to enable proper 
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evaluation between existing policies and theoretical framework. Data for this section is fairly 
narrow, since contents of the player contracts are not public. This survey was conducted to 69 
players in Liiga that covers approximately 10-15% of all players in Liiga. Despite the sample 
is narrow, it helps us to form an understanding of current policies. Both the survey and 
interviews were conducted anonymously to ensure reliable and genuine results. The following 
section will uncover the status quo inside Finnish professional hockey regarding paying for 
performance. 
 
6.2 Empirical findings 
 
This section is separated in two, the first part gathering together the relevant findings of the 
empirical study, whilst the latter pieces together the results based on executive interviews. 
Findings are presented in a descriptive manner to the extent they facilitate the further qualitative 
analysis. 
 
Survey for the players 
 
The survey for the players involved multiple questions regarding salary level, realized share of 
performance-based pay compared to total income and applied performance measures for 
rewarding from both individual and team perspective. Moreover, players were enquired their 
preferences considering e.g. if the rewards should be based on team or individual performance. 
 
The attendees were divided into four categories based on their salary level during last ice 
hockey season 2019-2020 to examine how the wage level affects to the incentive plan for 
individuals. Simultaneously, this categorizing enables evaluation of how well the population is 
represented in the survey. As a result, the sample forms a legitimate representation of the 
population from the pay distribution perspective since the respondents were quite evenly 
balanced between the categories. However, more experienced players and players performed 
better in the past seem to be slightly more present since 30.4% of the respondents earned less 
than the median player earned in previous season, which was in total €55.000. This observation 
is further validated since 37.7% of the respondents earned more than €100.000, whilst during 
season 2018-2019 roughly one-fourth of players totalled such income in the population 
(Miettinen, 2020). 
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The results were clear and consistent with respect to what was revealed in the interview 
sessions. While the salary level increases, the strength of incentives diminishes. The reasoning 
behind this phenomenon will be explicated further while discussing through key findings based 
on interview sessions.  
 
The survey enquired both potential sources for earning bonuses defined in contracts as well the 
realized levels of these bonuses. Only 56.5% of respondents reported that contracts involved 
some individual bonuses, whilst bonuses based on team performance were included in 62.5% 
of contracts. However, the average amount of realized monetary rewards was only 3.2% of total 
income, whilst as much as 60.8% of players reported zero realized bonuses. Hence, both 
previous observations indicate that contract-based incentive pay does not form a significant 
source of income for most players in Liiga. 
 
For players whose contracts involved performance-based pay, the applied individual 
performance measures were quite similar with each other and not matching very strongly with 
job design. Players are generally measured through the amount of goals scored, total points, 
games played and time-on-ice. The last one reflects the trust coach has on player’s abilities. 
Total points summarizes both scored goals and assisting teammate for scoring. Goaltender 
performance is measured through save percentage and goals against on average, which both are 
quite robust for measuring their ability to protect the own net. Normally, the incentives are tied 
for performance by non-linear, lump-sum bonus structure. If contracts include incentives based 
on team success, the rewarding plan is also based on lump-sum structure providing discrete 
bonuses. The threshold is often set for qualifying into the first round of playoffs, while 
proceeding further towards finals or championship provide additional discrete bonuses. 
 
Eventually, the last section of the survey investigated player preferences regarding the potential 
effects of stronger incentives, potential for better match the measures with job design and finally 
whether the incentive pay should be based on individual or team performance. Firstly, the 
players were asked how their motivation or performance would change if their pay would be 
more strongly tied to performance. Answers were very consistent: more than three-quarters of 
players reported that their motivation and performance would not significantly change.  
 
Secondly, player opinions were distributed quite evenly when they were asked if the 
performance measures could be better matched with job design. 54% of respondents reported 
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that measures could be designed to match better with job design. Some players provided 
additional information that, in their opinion, player statistics are not reported precisely enough 
to be properly utilized in incentive systems, or alternatively the measuring system is lacking 
decent coordination among the league regarding definitions of e.g. how faceoffs or tackles are 
reported. 
 
Thirdly, the majority of players stated that incentives based on team performance are more 
important to be included into rewarding plans. This result is well in line with Baruch et al. 
(2004), as their research paper examining Chinese professional sports suggested that incentives 
for athletes should be dependent on the level of desired collaboration between players. For 
instance, athletics is more suitable for individual bonuses whilst ice hockey can be seen to be 
one with far more cooperation, and thus incentives based on team performance should be more 
existent in incentive pay plans for ice hockey players. Additionally, some players voluntarily 
reported that based on earlier experience individual bonuses may lead to adverse scenarios from 
team perspective since incentives based on individual performance may increase self-interests 
at the expense of team success, which is well in line with observation of e.g. Lazear & Gibbs 
(2015): “you get what you pay for”. 
 
Executive interviews 
 
Interviews revealed very soon that results of the survey and incentive pay policies in 
organizations participating for these interview sessions were highly consistent. Executive 
interviews provided important additional information of current policies and reasons behind the 
system. Interviews revealed that in these organizations, incentive pay is not very broadly 
utilized. To demonstrate, one CEO revealed that realized bonuses were only 1.5% of the total 
player budget in their organization.  
 
Commonly, the most experienced players with proven abilities are not rewarded based on 
individual performance besides the base salary. The interviewees were very consistent with 
their perceptions why this is the current situation. First of all, labour markets in professional ice 
hockey have become more global than ever, which has led to tougher competition for players. 
Furthermore, the Finnish professional sports market is relatively small compared to the greatest 
rival leagues in Europe. In other words, this reflects strictly to the financial resources of 
organizations, which, according to the interviews, exposes Finnish organizations to compete by 
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raising base wage to induce desired players. At the same time, the guaranteed compensation 
comes closer, or in some cases may even exceed the estimated value of player contribution 
which results to declined willingness for organizations to offer monetary incentives on top of 
base salaries, even if encouraging players by incentives would increase player performance 
during games, which most likely results better athletic performance also as a team. Thus, the 
minor role of incentive pay is to some extent conflicting, since athletic performance can be 
assumed to be one of the key drivers for financial performance as well. However, player 
performance is somewhat risky, and certain level of performance is thus included into the base 
salary because of tough competition in labour markets. 
 
In contrast, for younger players with shorter background in professional hockey, incentive pay 
systems are involved in most contracts. This policy derives from the fact that their market value 
is hard to measure, since they are only in the beginning of their career with narrow proof of 
existing skillset compared to true professionals. Hence, their range of outside options is far 
smaller than for more experienced players. According to the interviews, the rewarding 
structures are in most cases based on lump-sum plan, providing a discrete bonus after reaching 
some threshold. 
 
Instead of individual bonuses, these organizations participating the interviews tend to reward 
players based on team success. To advance the fairness of the system, these rewards are 
generally evenly shared among the players, independent of player’s role inside the team. The 
contracting behind team-based incentives varies between organizations. One organization 
purely relies to quantitative measures by defining certain bonuses of reaching specific 
thresholds ex ante. In contrast, also subjective evaluation is utilized to reward players ex post. 
The latter can be seen somewhat problematic from the player perspective since the realization 
of the rewards is fully depend on supervisor discretion. 
 
Besides competitive labour markets and tense budget constraint, interviewees highlighted the 
incentives deriving from inside of the system. As described earlier, the salary levels between 
different leagues are significant. This forms an effective source of exogenous incentives based 
on career development, and partly reliefs the pressure for organizations to pursue often costly 
incentive systems to increase player effort through monetary rewards. Furthermore, the 
interviews emphasized that many times non-monetary benefits supporting career development, 
such as high-quality training centers, unlimited access for physical therapy or simply ability to 
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offer extensive coverage may be even attractive for players negotiating upcoming contracts than 
monetary incentives. 
 
 
7 DISCUSSION 
 
Extensive amount of earlier literature facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the data available 
for this study. This final section provides key insights regarding current incentive pay policies 
in Liiga. Paying for performance based on individual performance seems to be only minor part 
of incentives, realizing mostly on contracts for young players with low market value and fewer 
previous merits from professional hockey. For the experienced true professionals, the greatest 
incentives appear to derive mostly from team success or through career development, of which 
the latter can be identified to be the strongest source of incentives. Relatively short contracts, 
very competitive labour markets for players with average skills and on the other hand incredibly 
high compensation level for top tier players compose an effective incentive system as a whole, 
being not dependent on the actions of the organizations. 
 
To elaborate reasoning behind the absence of individual incentives, very competitive labour 
markets which forces organizations to compete for players fitting well into their strategy by 
raising base salaries in contract offer sheets. At the same time, budget constraint restricts 
capacity for providing incentives on top of the guaranteed compensation. However, high base 
salaries can be interpreted as prepayment for future performance. Since the contracts are 
relatively short, players must constantly signal their abilities to future employers for 
maintaining or improving current income level. From this perspective, player salaries are 
involving significant amount of expected level of performance. Advantageous for players, but 
in contrast, organization expose themselves in great risk in case player motivation decreases for 
any reason during the season. 
 
Organizations tend to underestimate the feasibility of paying for performance during the season, 
while focusing mostly on subjective evaluation while pursuing to assess the market value for 
potential recruitments accurately. Organizations appear to be contented in relying on player 
monitoring to maximize their cost-efficiency regarding player output. This is somewhat 
conflicting, since earlier literature provides clear evidence that players with stronger incentives 
tend to perform better than players with higher guaranteed amount of compensation.  
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Consequently, this paper suggests organizations to consider incentive pay systems as an 
investment for athletic performance. In general, player output is very clearly identifiable 
compared to non-sports industries. So far applied evaluation metrics alone appear to be 
applicable for designing effective incentive pay systems. However, it is important to recognize 
that to prevent distorted incentives, it is crucial to balance the incentives by including both 
offensive and defensive metrics into the system, remember that “you get what you pay for”. 
Despite some players were sceptical towards more customized incentive pay plans, pointing 
out that league level statistics are poorly coordinated, nothing inhibits organizations for creating 
their own more suitable measures that are gathered diligently. Naturally, these metrics could be 
similar with the league-level statistics but adjusted properly to fit into the incentive pay plan 
considering the job design of individual players. Furthermore, decisions for eventual measures 
and measuring criteria should be decentralized to promote the reliability and fairness of the 
system. Hence, investing in designing appropriate performance evaluation metrics that match 
well in job design most likely would offer a competitive edge against rival organizations 
ignoring this perspective in their business strategy. 
 
This paper has also several further suggestions for improving the design of existing incentive 
pay policies yet considering the current operational environment. First of all, to the extent 
incentive pay plans exist, linear rewarding structure should be preferable instead of prevailing 
lump-sum structure because linear plans offer constant marginal benefit of effort, which ensures 
that the chosen effort level is independent with past performance. In adverse scenarios, non-
linear lump-sum plans may cause either zero or infinite incentives, which may encourage 
excessive risk taking or complete shirking. Furthermore, the implementation of incentives 
based on team performance appears to long for improvement in some organizations, since the 
rewards are not always defined ex ante in terms and conditions of contracts. Defining these 
rewards facilitates the trust towards the system and increases incentives since players can 
observe them while choosing their effort level. 
 
This paper has offered explicit guidelines for designing and implementation of effective 
incentive pay systems by relying on extensive earlier literature. For future research, this paper 
suggests examining the effectiveness of these policies in more quantitative manner to disclose 
statistical effectiveness of incentive pay policies in the Finnish professional hockey.  
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